Dr. Mahir J. Ibrahimov
ArmyU Culture, Regional Expertise & Language (CREL)
Management Office (CRELMO)
21 April 2016

Russian New Generation Warfare in Ukraine:

Implications for Regional and Global Security

Culture and Language Management Office (CRELMO) jointly with the University of Kansas and CGSC

DATE: April 21, Thursday, 2016 **TIME:** 12:30 – 14:30 CST

LOCATION: Arnold Conference Room, Lewis & Clark Center, Fort Leavenworth, KS

For more information contact the CRELMO Program Manager at 913-684-3345 *or* http://usacac.army.mil/organizations/cace/lrec

SENIOR LEADER KEYNOTE ADDRESS:

Brig. Gen. Eugene J. LeBoeuf - Army University's Vice Provost of Academic Affairs, Fort Leavenworth

SPEAKERS:

Dr. Mariya Y. Omelicheva - Assoc. Professor, Dept. of Political Science, University of Kansas

Dr. Vitaly A. Chernetsky - Director, Center for Russian, East European & Eurasian Studies, University of Kansas

Dr. Christopher Marsh - Professor, School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS), CGSC, Fort Leavenworth

CH (MAJ) Seth H. George - World Religions Instructor, CGSC, Fort Leavenworth

MODERATOR:

Dr. Mahir J. Ibrahimov - Program Manager, CRELMO, CAC/ArmyU, Fort Leavenworth

SOVIET/RUSSIAN STRATEGIC MILITARY CULTURE: EASTERN EUROPE & AFGHANISTAN (USSR) CHECHNYA/GEORGIA/UKRAINE (RUSSIA)

- The USSR bipolar international system became unipolar.

- Russia ceased to be a great power with significantly less resources.

- Russian near abroad is still strategically important (Europe an



RUSSIA'S CONCERN OVER NATO'S EXPANSION

- **The Lithuanian and Estonian defense ministries have expressed alarm at the increased military activity, and drawn comparisons with moves prior to the Russian invasion of Crimea.**

- **"Russia's frequent snap military drills near its eastern European neighbors could be part of a strategy that will open the door for a Russian offensive on the Baltic states" (defense expert Martin Hurt, deputy director at Estonia's International**

UKRAINE CONFLICT 2014 TO PRESENT

- **The real question is the extent to which Russia is prepared to back the rebels' quest for territorial gain.**
- **The Kremlin has repeatedly denied supplying troops and sophisticated military hardware to the rebels.**

Russian Soldiers captured by Ukrainian Armed forces, 2014

- **Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko estimated that as many as 9,000 Russian troops were backing the rebels.**
- **Ukrainian territory of Crimea is now part of Russia.**
- **The capture of Mariupol would pave the way for a land corridor to the peninsula.**



Russia's regional military commands

By December 1, 2010, the number of military districts in Russia will be cut from six to four. Unified strategic commands will be set up on their basis

The Kaliningrad special region
The Baltic Fleet
The Western Military District (West Strategic Command) with headquarters in St. Petersburg
The Moscow and Leningrad military districts
The Central Military District (Central Strategic Command) with headquarters in Yekaterinburg
The Volga-Urals Military District and the western part of the Siberian Military District
St. Petersburg
Yekaterinburg
Rostov-on-Don
Khabarovsk
The South Military District (South Strategic Command) with headquarters in Rostov-on-Don
The North Caucasus Military District
The East Military District (East Strategic Command) with headquarters in Khabarovsk
The Far East Military District and the eastern part of the Siberian Military District

The reduction of the number of military districts will not lead to cuts in the military personnel. The 150,000 officers currently serving in the Army will continue to perform their duties, but officers may be moved to serve at new locations

RIANOVOSTI © 2010

RUSSIA DRAWS CLOSER TO CHINA: U.S. FACES A NEW CHALLENGE

- **Estranged from the West over NATO Expansion, and especially the Ukraine, Russia seeks economic and political support from China.**
- **Mr. Putin trying to fashion a coalition to resist what both countries view as American arrogance (*Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO),BRICS).***
- **Arms deals between the two at around $2 billion annually, a $3 billion deal being negotiated for S-400 missile systems.**
- **Russia-China rapprochement presents a profound challenge to**

RUSSIA'S "NEW GENERATION WARFARE"

MARIYA Y. OMELICHEVA

POLITICAL SCIENCE, UNIVERSITY OF KANSAS

“HYBRID”, “MULTI-DIMENSIONAL”, “NEW GENERATION”, “IRREGULAR”

An approach to conflict that embraces “simultaneous employment of multiple instruments of war, including non-military means where information warfare, such as mass political manipulation, is a major capability”

Lieutenant General Ben Hodges, commander of Army forces in Europe



CHANGE IN THE PERCEPTIONS OF THREATS

The Russian government believes that Russia is engaged in a civilizational as well as geopolitical struggle with the West. This struggle is no longer about the territorial spaces and resources, but includes the war of ideas and values, the dispute of minds

The Russian army appears to believe that the world is in a continual state of conflict (lines between war and peace are blurred)

Use of asymmetrical operations without the formal declaration of war

General V. Gerasmov,

The chief of the General Staff

CHANGE IN THE PERCEPTIONS OF CAPABILITIES

Specific capabilities

The use of Special Forces linked up with internal opposition groups in combination with information operations, cyber warfare, legal warfare, economic war and other activities that are linked to a strategic outcome and constantly modified to meet the specific needs of a particular operation

TRADITIONAL METHODS	“NEW WARFARE”
Military action starts after strategic deployment (declaration of war)	Military action starts by groups of troops during peace time (no war declaration).
Frontal clashes between large units consisting mostly of ground units	Non-contact clashes between highly maneuverable interspecific fighting groups
Defeat of manpower, firepower, taking control of regions and borders to gain territorial control	Shift in focus from direct destruction to **direct influence**; from direct annihilation of the opponent to its inner decay
Combat operations on land, air, and sea (traditional “3D” battleground”	A combination of political, economic, information, technological, and ecological campaigns. Emphasis on information/psychological warfare
Conventional forces managed by rigid hierarchy and governance	Specially prepared forces and commercial irregular groupings; use of armed civilians
War has spatial and temporal limits	State of permanent war as the natural condition in national life

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Russian "New Generation Warfare"



STAGES OF “NEW WARFARE”

I. Non-military asymmetric warfare (encompassing information, moral, psychological, ideological, diplomatic, and economic measures)

II. Special operations to mislead political and military leaders

III. Intimidation, deceiving, and bribing government and military officers, with the objective of making them abandon their service duties.

IV. Destabilizing propaganda to increase discontent among the population

V. Establishment of no-fly zones over the country to be attacked, imposition of blockades, and VI. Commencement of military action, immediately preceded by large-scale recon- naissance and subversive missions

VII. Combination of targeted information operation, electronic warfare operation, aerospace operation, continuous airforce harassment, combined with the use of high- precision weapons launched from various platforms.

VIII. Roll over the remaining points of resistance and destroy surviving enemy units.

IMPLICATIONS FOR REGIONAL SECURITY

Do not rely on Art. 5 of NATO but develop a more self-reliant approach

Reconsider the strategies and methods used to fight wars

Do not fight the war that fits your organization and weapon, but choose your way of fighting, then build your system

Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui, *Unrestricted Warfare* (Beijing: PLA Literature and Arts Publishing House, 1999)

Ukraine Orthodoxy
Symphony Between Church and Society

CHAPLAIN SETH H. GEORGE
U.S. ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLLEGE

Maidian Square; Kiev, Ukraine

“This close alliance between the government and the Russian Orthodox Church has become a defining characteristic of Mr. Putin’s tenure, a mutually reinforcing choreography that is again described as working “in symphony.” Clifford Levy

Havana, Cuba;
12 February 2016

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